A CITIZEN'S BLOG

One of the most surprising things I read in Moneyball was the fact that “clutch hitting” didn’t exist. Players, a man named Dick Cramer (a researcher for the pharmaceutical company SmithKline French), discovered during the 1980s, didn’t play any better when the game was on the line than any time else. (See, Moneyball, p. 79.) Players didn’t rise to the occasion and perform better under pressure. This information, cold and impersonal as it is, goes against one of the more dearly held bits of conventional wisdom in baseball: that elite players rise up and become superstars when the game is on the line. In an interview in SI’s 2004 season preview, the Yankees Reggie Jackson hotly disputed the idea that clutch hitting didn’t exist (calling it “the absolute dumbest thing I have ever heard in my life.”), relying upon gut instincts and anecdotal evidence to make his argument. Angrily, Derek Jeter chimed in: “You can take those stat guys and throw them out the window.” (Imagine how he felt after the “stats guys” derrided his 2004 Golden Glove.) (Sports Illustrated, April 5, 2004: p. 60-62.) It is one of the primary divides between the old school and the new school of Sabremetrics.

I should note that some in the Sabremetrics world have made the argument that clutch hitting exists, however insignficant it may be. Tangotiger, for example, found that Jason Giambi and Miguel Tejada added a few runs here and there in “clutch” situations, but otherwise chalked up “clutch hitting” largely to luck.

Hardball Times lists Batting Average with Runners in Scoring Position (BA w/ RISP) as part of their stats package and I was very, very surprised by three things I saw when I ran the numbers for the Phillies.

To start, look at the NL’s BA w/ RISP:

(BA w/ RISP) / (BA Variance)
Houston: .274 / +.007
San Francisco: .271 / +.001
St. Louis: .270 / -.008
Chicago: .266 / -.002
Pittsburgh: .266 / +.006
Atlanta: .263 / -.007
Colorado: .259 / -.016
San Diego: .258 / -.015
Philadelphia: .257 / -.010
Arizona: .257 / +.004
Los Angeles: .256 / -.006
Florida: .255 / -.009
Cincinnati: .248 / -.002
New York Mets: .245 / -.004
Montreal: .238 / -.010
Milwaukee: .221 / -.027
League: .257 / -.006

By the way, the results are somewhat different in the AL: .272 BA w/ RISP, a +.002 variance … Milwaukee’s spread stunned me, but equally surprising were the Pittsburgh Pirates, as one of the better teams when it came to hitting with runners on second and third. The Astros are an interesting case: no team hit higher with RISP, and no team rose more above their BA’s to excel in the clutch.

As you can see, the Phillies really stunk things up when it came to driving in runs. How did the Phillies players do individually? (As I said, there are three stunning results):

(BA w/ RISP) / (BA Variance)
Starting Lineup:
Abreu: .322 / +.021
Rollins: .313 / +.024
Byrd: .309 / +.081
Bell: .297 / +.006
Polanco: .270 / -.028
Burrell: .263 / +.006
Thome: .203 / -.071
Lieberthal: .142 / -.129

Bench:
Howard: .364 / +.082
Michaels: .284 / +.010
Pratt: .281 / +.023
Utley: .275 / +.009
Perez: .267 / +.051
Glanville: .243 / +.033
Ledee: .237 / -.048

The three surprises? I refer of course to Lieberthal’s .129 point fall with runners in scoring position, Thome’s .071 point collapse, and Byrd’s surprising .081 increase. Here is what I think:

-Byrd’s .309 was one of the best on the team, after Rollins, Abreu and Ryan Howard. I wonder how small the sample is that we are talking about, however: batting first or eighth, there aren’t a lot of opportunities to hit with runners in scoring position, so I wonder if Byrd simply got lucky a few times or not. Let us assume there are a lot of AB’s here: Byrd’s .309 suggests that he didn’t perform poorly in 2004 due to pressure. When the pressure was on in certain situations, Byrd really seemed to excell.

-Lieberthal’s .142 was the worst on the Phillies. It shocks me to see that, but maybe it isn’t that surprising: Lieberthal usually hit seventh with Marlon Byrd sitting behind him. I think teams probably pitched around him, figuring they’d be able to take care of Byrd with little difficulty. So Lieberthal’s .142 probably is better than advertised, but surprising.

-Thome’s .203 is what’s shocking. This guy is the Phillies MVP. He’s their big bat, their most important hitter. If he’s wiffing in the clutch, then the Phillies are in (big) trouble … I’m at a loss as to why he hit so poorly: Pat Burrell and David Bell usually hit behind him, so it wasn’t like teams knew they could get away with pitching around Thome. I initially thought this might be part of a larger decline in Thome’s abilities (30 Win Shares in 2003, 22 Win Shares in 2004), but I don’t think that’s the case:

2004 / 2003
OBP: .396 / .385
SLG: .581 / .573
BA: .274 / .266

I’m utterly at a loss to explain why Thome hit so poorly in 2004 w/ RISP. No protection from Bell and Burrell? A decline in ability? Or simple luck?

(Anyone know what Thome hit w/ RISP in 2003? In 2002? I’d love to know.)

Clutch hitting circa 2004. More tomorrow on the current state of baseball, the Phillies and the Eagles chances in the playoffs.